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Abstract. Analytic proof calculi are introduced for box and diamond fragments of basic
modal fuzzy logics that combine the Kripke semantics of modal logic K with the many-
valued semantics of Go¨del logic. The calculi are used to establish completeness and com-
plexity results for these fragments.
1. Introduction
A broad spectrum of concepts spanning necessity, knowledge, belief, obligation, and spatio-
temporal relations have been investigated in the field of modal logic (see, e.g., [10]), while
notions relating to truth degrees such as vagueness, possibility, and uncertainty have re-
ceived careful attention in the study of fuzzy logics (see, e.g., [19, 25]). Relatively little
attention, however, has been paid to logics combining these approaches, that is, to modal
fuzzy logics. Ideally, a systematic development of these logics would provide a unified ap-
proach to a range of topics considered in the literature such as fuzzy belief [22, 17], spatial
reasoning in the presence of vagueness [27], fuzzy similarity measures [18], and fuzzy de-
scription logics, which may be understood, analogously to classical description logics, as
multi-modal fuzzy logics (see, e.g., [30, 21, 6]).
Fuzzy modal logics developed for particular applications are typically situated quite
high up in the spectrum of modal logics, e.g., at the level of the logic S5 (see, e.g., [19]) or
based on Zadeh’s minimal fuzzy logic (see, e.g., [32]). On the other hand, general approaches
dealing with many-valued modal logics, such as [14, 15], have concentrated mainly on the
finite-valued case. In particular, Priest [26] and Bou et al. [7, 8] have provided frameworks
for studying many-valued modal logics but their results so far (e.g., for axiomatizations and
decidability) relate mostly to finite-valued modal logics. The general strategy, followed also
in this paper, is to consider logics based either on standard Kripke frames or Kripke frames
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where the accessibility relation between worlds is many-valued (fuzzy). Propositional con-
nectives are interpreted using the given (fuzzy) logic at individual worlds, while the values
of modal formulas A and ♦A are calculated using the infima and suprema, respectively, of
values of A at accessible (to some degree) worlds. Validity can then be defined as usual as
truth (e.g., taking the value 1) at all worlds of all models. Let us emphasize, however, that
this approach diverges significantly from certain other developments in the literature. In
particular, intuitionistic and intermediate logics extended with modalities, as investigated
in, e.g., [28, 31], make use of two accessibility relations for Kripke models, one for the modal
operator and another for the intuitionistic connectives. Also, the modalities added to fuzzy
logics in works such as [20, 11] represent truth stressers such as “very true” or “classically
true” and, unlike the modalities considered here, may be interpreted as unary functions on
the real unit interval.
In this paper, we narrow our focus on the fuzzy side to propositional Go¨del logic G,
the infinite-valued version of a family of finite-valued logics introduced by Go¨del in [16],
axiomatized by Dummett in [12] by adding the prelinearity schema (A→ B)∨ (B → A) to
an axiomatization of propositional intuitionistic logic. Aside from being an important fuzzy
and intermediate logic, there are good practical reasons to focus on G in modal contexts.
As noted in [7], G is the only fuzzy logic whose modal analogues with a fuzzy accessibility
relation admit the schema (A → B) → (A → B) (roughly speaking, since G, unlike
other fuzzy logics, admits both weakening and contraction). Also, a multimodal variant of
this logic (restricted, however, to finite models) has already been proposed as the basis for a
fuzzy description logic in [6]. Caicedo and Rodr´ıguez have already provided axiomatizations
for the box and diamond fragments of a Go¨del modal logic based on fuzzy Kripke frames
in [9], observing that the box fragment is also characterized by standard Kripke frames and
does not have the finite model property, while, conversely, the diamond fragment has the
finite model property but is not characterized by standard Kripke frames.
In this work, we introduce (the first) analytic proof systems for fragments of the Go¨del
modal logic studied by Caicedo and Rodr´ıguez and also for the “other” diamond fragment
based on standard Kripke frames, the broader aim being to initiate a general investigation
into the proof theory of modal fuzzy logics (e.g., as undertaken for propositional and first-
order fuzzy logics in [25]). A wide range of proof systems have been developed for Go¨del
logic, including the sequent calculi of Sonobe [29] and Dyckhoff [13], decomposition systems
of Avron and Konikowska [3], graph-based methods of Larchey-Wendling [23], and goal-
directed systems of Metcalfe et al. [25]. Here we extend the sequent of relations calculus
of Baaz and Fermu¨ller [4], which provides a particularly elegant and suitable framework
for investigating computational properties such as complexity and proof search, and also
the hypersequent calculus of Avron [2], which is better suited to extensions to the first-
order level and other logics. More precisely, we provide sequent of relations calculi for all
three fragments and a hypersequent calculus for the box fragment. We are then able to
use these calculi to obtain PSPACE-completeness results for the fragments and construc-
tive completeness proofs for Hilbert-style axiomatizations. In the final section, we discuss
connections with related work on fuzzy description logics, modal intermediate logics, and
other proof frameworks, and consider the problems involved with extending this approach
to the full logics.
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(A1) A→ (B → A) (A8) (A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B))
(A2) (A ∧B)→ A (A9) (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
(A3) (A ∧B)→ B (A10) ((A→ C) ∧ (B → C))→ ((A ∨B)→ C)
(A4) A→ (B → (A ∧ B)) (A11) (A→ (B → C))→ ((A ∧B)→ C)
(A5) (⊥→ A) ∧ (A→ ⊤) (A12) ((C → A) ∧ (C → B))→ (C → (A ∧ B))
(A6) A→ (A ∨B) (A13) (A→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B)
(A7) B → (A ∨ B) (A14) (A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
A A→ B
B
(mp)
Figure 1: The Hilbert System HG
2. Go¨del Logic
2.1. Syntax and Semantics. We define Go¨del logic G based on a language LG consisting
of a fixed countably infinite set Var of (propositional) variables, denoted p, q, binary con-
nectives →, ∧, ∨, and constants ⊥, ⊤. We call variables and constants atoms, denoted a, b.
The set of formulas FmLG , with arbitrary members denoted A,B,C, . . . , is defined induc-
tively as usual, and the complexity of a formula A, denoted |A|, is defined as the number of
connectives occurring in A. We let ¬A =def A→ ⊥ and A↔ B =def (A→ B) ∧ (B → A).
We use Γ,Π,Σ,∆,Θ to stand for finite multisets of formulas, written [A1, . . . , An], letting
[] denote the empty multiset of formulas and Γ⊎∆ the multiset sum of Γ and ∆. We write∨
Γ and
∧
Γ with
∨
[] =def ⊥ and
∧
[] =def ⊤ for iterated disjunctions and conjunctions of
formulas, and define Γ0 =def [] and Γ
n+1 =def Γ ⊎ Γ
n for n ∈ N.
The standard semantics of Go¨del logic is characterized by the Go¨del t-norm min and
its residuum →G, defined on the real unit interval [0, 1] by
x→G y =
{
y if x > y
1 otherwise.
More precisely, a G-valuation is a function v : FmLG → [0, 1] satisfying
v(⊥) = 0
v(⊤) = 1
v(A→ B) = v(A)→G v(B)
v(A ∧B) = min(v(A), v(B))
v(A ∨B) = max(v(A), v(B)).
A formula A is G-valid, written |=G A, iff v(A) = 1 for all G-valuations v.
Sometimes it will be helpful to consider extensions of the language LG with (finitely
many) constants, denoted c, d, where G-valuations satisfy v(c) = rc for each additional
constant c for some fixed rc ∈ [0, 1].
1 In such cases, ⊤ and ⊥ are considered together
alongside the extra constants, with v(r⊤) = 1 and v(r⊥) = 0.
A standard axiomatization HG for Go¨del logic in the language LG is provided in Figure 1.
HG is complete with respect to the standard semantics, and also with respect to both Go¨del
algebras, defined as Heyting algebras obeying the prelinearity law ⊤ = (x→ y) ∨ (y → x),
and linearly ordered (intuitionistic) Kripke models. Analytic proof systems for Go¨del logic,
1Note that the real number rc does not appear in the language, rather it is fixed at the same time as the
constant is added to the language.
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Axioms and Structural Rules
S | A ≤ A
(id)
S | ⊤ ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ < ⊥
S
(cs)
S | A ≤ B | ⊤ ≤ B
S | A ≤ B
(wl)
S | A ≤ B | A ≤ ⊥
S | A ≤ B
(wr)
S
S | A ⊳ B
(ew)
S | A ⊳1 B | C ⊳2 D | A ≤ D S | A ⊳1 B | C ⊳2 D | C ⊳1 B
S | A ⊳1 B | C ⊳2 D
(com)
Logical Rules
S | A ⊳ C | B ⊳ C
S | A ∧ B ⊳ C
(∧⊳)
S | C ⊳ A S | C ⊳ B
S | C ⊳ A ∧ B
(⊳∧)
S | A ⊳ C S | B ⊳ C
S | A ∨ B ⊳ C
(∨⊳)
S | C ⊳ A | C ⊳ B
S | C ⊳ A ∨ B
(⊳∨)
S | B < A S | B < C
S | A→ B < C
(→<)
S | A ≤ B | C < B S | C < ⊤
S | C < A→ B
(<→)
S | ⊤ ≤ C | B < A S | B ≤ C
S | A→ B ≤ C
(→≤)
S | A ≤ B | C ≤ B
S | C ≤ A→ B
(≤→)
Figure 2: The Sequent of Relations Calculus SG
where structures appearing in a derivation are constructed from subformulas of the formula
to be proved, have been defined in a number of different frameworks. Below we consider
two of the most useful of these frameworks, sequents of relations and hypersequents.
2.2. Sequents of Relations. Sequents of relations, consisting of sets of pairs of formulas
ordered by the relations ≤ and <, were introduced by Baaz and Fermu¨ller in [4] as a proof-
theoretic framework for Go¨del and other “projective” logics. More formally, a sequent of
relations S for a language L is a finite (possibly empty) set of ordered triples, written
A1 ⊳1 B1 | . . . | An ⊳n Bn
where Ai, Bi ∈ FmL and ⊳i ∈ {<,≤} for i = 1 . . . n. A sequent of relations is called atomic
if it contains only atoms.
For Go¨del logic, the syntactic symbol ⊳ ∈ {≤, <} is interpreted as the corresponding
relation over [0, 1]. That is, for a sequent of relations S for LG,
|=G S iff for all G-valuations v, v(A) ⊳ v(B) for some (A ⊳ B) ∈ S,
and we say in this case that S is G-valid.
Alternatively, we can define the following formula interpretation:
IS({Ai < Bi}
n
i=1 | {Cj ≤ Dj}
m
j=1) =
n∧
i=1
(Bi → Ai)→
m∨
j=1
(Cj → Dj).
It follows easily using the deduction theorem for Go¨del logic that |=G S iff |=G IS(S).
The sequent of relations calculus SG for Go¨del logic displayed in Figure 2 consists of
logical rules taken from [4] together with additional axioms and structural rules based on
similar calculi for G presented in [25]. The rule (com) (the only rule with more than one non-
context relation in the conclusion) reflects the linearity of the truth values in Go¨del logic,
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while the rule (ew) is not strictly necessary for completeness, but is useful for constructing
derivations.
Note also that the following helpful axioms and rules for the constants and negation
are derivable:
S | ⊥ < ⊤
(<)
S | ⊥ ≤ A
(⊥≤)
S | A ≤ ⊤
(≤⊤)
S | ⊥ < A S | ⊥ < C
S | ¬A < C
(¬<)
S | A ≤ ⊥ S | C < ⊤
S | C < ¬A
(<¬)
S | ⊤ ≤ B | ⊥ < A
S | ¬A ≤ B
(¬≤)
S | A ≤ ⊥ | B ≤ ⊥
S | B ≤ ¬A
(≤¬)
Given some fixed notion of L-validity, we say that a rule is L-sound if whenever the premises
are L-valid, then so is the conclusion. Conversely, a rule is L-invertible if whenever the con-
clusion is L-valid, then so are the premises. The key observation for SG is that, unlike several
other calculi for Go¨del logic, the logical rules are not only G-sound, but also G-invertible [4].
Since upwards applications of the logical rules terminate (a standard argument), this means
that the question of the G-validity of a sequent of relations can be reduced to the question
of the G-validity of atomic sequents of relations.
Moreover, the following lemma provides a perspicuous and useful characterization of
G-valid atomic sequents of relations.
Lemma 2.1. An atomic sequent of relations S (for LG possibly with additional constants)
is G-valid iff there exists (ai ⊳i ai+1) ∈ S for i = 1 . . . n such that one of the following holds:
(1) a1 = an+1 and ⊳i is ≤ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(2) a1 = ⊥ and ⊳i is ≤ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(3) an+1 = ⊤ and ⊳i is ≤ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(4) a1 = c, an+1 = d, and rc < rd
(5) a1 = c, an+1 = d, rc = rd, and ⊳i is ≤ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. It is clear that S is G-valid if any of the above conditions are met. For the other
direction, we proceed by induction on the number of different variables occurring in S. Note
first that if one of a ≤ a, a ≤ ⊤, ⊥ ≤ a, c < d for rc < rd, or c ≤ d for rc = rd occurs in S,
then we are done. This takes care of the base case. For the inductive step, we fix a variable
q occurring in S, and define:
S< =def {a < b | {a < q, q < b} ⊆ S}
S≤ =def {a ≤ b | {a ⊳1 q, q ⊳2 b} ⊆ S,≤∈ {⊳1, ⊳2}}
S ′ =def {a ⊳ b ∈ S | a 6= q, b 6= q} ∪ S< ∪ S≤.
S ′ has fewer different variables than S. So if S ′ is G-valid, then applying the induction
hypothesis to S ′, we have (ai ⊳i ai+1) ∈ S
′ for i = 1 . . . n, satisfying one of the above condi-
tions. But then by replacing the inequalities ai ⊳i ai+1 that occur in S< or S≤ appropriately
by ai ⊳
′ q and q ⊳′′ ai+1, we get that one of the conditions holds for S. Hence it is sufficient
to show that S ′ is G-valid. Suppose otherwise, i.e., that there exists a G-valuation v such
that v(a) ⊳ v(b) does not hold for any a ⊳ b ∈ S ′. We show for a contradiction that S is not
G-valid. Let
x = min{v(a) | a ⊳ q ∈ S} and y = max{v(b) | q ⊳ b ∈ S}.
Note first that x ≥ y. Otherwise it follows that for some a, b, we have {a ⊳1 q, q ⊳2 b} ⊆ S
and v(a) < v(b). But then (a ⊳ b) ∈ S ′ so v(a) ≥ v(b), a contradiction. Hence there are two
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cases. If x > y, then we extend v such that x > v(q) > y. For any (a ⊳ q) or (q ⊳ b) in S, we
have v(a) ≥ x > v(q) > y ≥ v(b). So S is not G-valid, a contradiction. Now suppose that
x = y and extend v such that v(q) = x. We must have atoms a0, b0 such that (a0 < q) and
(q < b0) are in S and v(a0) = v(b0) = v(q). Now consider any (a ⊳1 q) or (q ⊳2 b) in S. Since
(a ⊳1 b0) and (a0 ⊳2 b) are in S
′, v(a) ⊳1 v(q) = v(b0) and v(a0) = v(q) ⊳2 v(b) cannot hold.
So S is again not G-valid, a contradiction.
Let us call an atomic sequent of relations S saturated if whenever S occurs as the
conclusion of a logical rule, (com), (cs), (wl), or (wr), then S also occurs as one of the
premises. In other words, the sequent of relations is “closed” under applications of these
rules. Then saturated G-valid atomic sequents of relations have the following property:
Lemma 2.2. Every saturated G-valid atomic sequent of relations S (for LG possibly with
additional constants) contains either (a ≤ a) or (c ⊳ d) where rc ⊳ rd.
Proof. By the previous lemma, each saturated G-valid atomic sequent of relations S contains
(ai ⊳i ai+1) for i = 1 . . . n such that one of the conditions (1)-(5) holds. The claim then
follows by a simple induction on n, where the base case makes use of (wl) and (wr), and
the inductive step makes use of (com).
Note that in the case of sequents of relations for LG without extra constants, every saturated
G-valid atomic sequent of relations, and hence every G-valid atomic sequent of relations, is
derivable in SG. Moreover, since, as mentioned above, the logical rules are G-sound and
G-invertible, and reduce G-valid sequents of relations to G-valid atomic sequents of relations,
it follows that:
Theorem 2.3. For any sequent of relations S for LG: ⊢SG S iff |=G S iff |=G IS(S).
2.3. A Hypersequent Calculus. Hypersequents were introduced by Avron in [1] as a
generalization of Gentzen sequents that allow disjunctive or parallel forms of reasoning.
Instead of a single sequent, there is a collection of sequents that can be “worked on” si-
multaneously. More precisely, a (single-conclusion) sequent S for a language L is (defined
here as) an ordered pair consisting of a finite multiset Γ of L-formulas and a multiset ∆
containing at most one L-formula, written Γ⇒ ∆. A (single-conclusion) hypersequent G for
L is a finite (possibly empty) multiset of sequents for L, written Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γn ⇒ ∆n
or sometimes, for short, as [Γi ⇒ ∆i]
n
i=1.
We interpret sequents and hypersequents for Go¨del logic as follows (recalling that∧
[] =def ⊤ and
∨
[] =def ⊥):
IH(Γ⇒ ∆) =def
∧
Γ→
∨
∆
IH(S1 | . . . | Sn) =def IH(S1) ∨ . . . ∨ IH(Sn).
Hypersequent calculi admitting cut-elimination have been defined for a wide range of fuzzy
logics (for details see [25]). In particular, the first example of such a system (modulo a
few inessential changes) was the calculus GG defined for Go¨del logic by Avron in [2]. This
calculus, displayed in Figure 3, can be viewed as a direct extension of a sequent calculus
for intuitionistic logic. Namely, the axioms, weakening, contraction, cut, and logical rules,
are obtained from standard sequent rules simply by adding a hypersequent context G to the
premises and conclusion. The external weakening and contraction rules, (ew) and (ec),
reflect the interpretation of “|” as a meta-level disjunction, while the communication rule
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Axioms and Structural Rules
G | A⇒ A
(id)
G | Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆
(⊥⇒)
G | Γ⇒ ⊤
(⇒⊤)
G | H | H
G | H
(ec)
G
G | H
(ew)
G | Γ1,Π1 ⇒ ∆1 G | Γ2,Π2 ⇒ ∆2
G | Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1 | Π1,Π2 ⇒ ∆2
(com)
G | Γ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, A⇒ ∆
(wl)
G | Γ⇒
G | Γ⇒ A
(wr)
G | Γ, A,A⇒ ∆
G | Γ, A⇒ ∆
(cl)
Logical Rules
G | Γ⇒ A G | Γ, B ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆
(→⇒)
G | Γ, A⇒ B
G | Γ⇒ A→ B
(⇒→)
G | Γ, A⇒ ∆
G | Γ, A ∧B ⇒ ∆
(∧⇒)1
G | Γ, B ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, A ∧B ⇒ ∆
(∧⇒)2
G | Γ, A⇒ ∆ G | Γ, B ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, A ∨ B ⇒ ∆
(∨⇒)
G | Γ⇒ A G | Γ⇒ B
G | Γ⇒ A ∧ B
(⇒∧)
G | Γ⇒ A
G | Γ⇒ A ∨ B
(⇒∨)1
G | Γ⇒ B
G | Γ⇒ A ∨ B
(⇒∨)2
Cut Rule
G | Γ1, A⇒ ∆ G | Γ2 ⇒ A
G | Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆
(cut)
Figure 3: The Gentzen System GG
(com), corresponding to the prelinearity axiom schema (A→ B) ∨ (B → A), is the crucial
ingredient in extending the system beyond intuitionistic logic.
Example 2.4. Consider the following derivation in GG:
p⇒ p (id) q ⇒ q (id)
p⇒ q | q ⇒ p
(com)
p⇒ q |⇒ q → p
(⇒→)
⇒ p→ q |⇒ q → p
(⇒→)
⇒ p→ q |⇒ (p→ q) ∨ (q → p)
(⇒∨)2
⇒ (p→ q) ∨ (q → p) |⇒ (p→ q) ∨ (q → p)
(⇒∨)1
⇒ (p→ q) ∨ (q → p)
(ec)
Notice that the hypersequent (p ⇒ q | q ⇒ p) two lines down might be read as just a
“hypersequent translation” of the prelinearity axiom (p→ q) ∨ (q → p).
Theorem 2.5 ([2]).
(1) For any hypersequent G for LG: |=G IH(G) iff ⊢GG G.
(2) GG admits cut-elimination.
For future reference, we observe that the following rules for the defined negation ¬A =def
A→ ⊥ are derivable in GG:
G | Γ⇒ A
G | Γ,¬A⇒
(¬⇒)
G | Γ, A⇒
G | Γ⇒ ¬A
(⇒¬)
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While the logical rules of the sequent of relations calculus SG are invertible, with conse-
quent advantages for establishing complexity and interpolation results and building efficient
proof systems, the hypersequent calculus GG does not have this property. The virtue of the
system lies rather with its close connection to sequent calculi for intuitionistic logic and the
existence of relatively straightforward cut-elimination proofs. In particular, this means that
GG, unlike SG, can be easily extended to the first-order level or with propositional quanti-
fiers, and used to prove, for example, completeness, Herbrand theorems, and Skolemization
results (see, e.g., [5, 25]).
3. Adding Modalities
3.1. Syntax and Semantics. We extend our language LG to a modal language L♦ by
adding the unary operators  and ♦, obtaining a set of formulas FmL♦ . For a finite
multiset Γ = [A1, . . . , An] of L♦-formulas and ⋆ ∈ {,♦}, we let ⋆Γ =def [⋆A1, . . . , ⋆An].
Go¨del modal logics are then defined, following similar ideas proposed in [14, 15, 19, 9, 7], as
generalizations of the modal logic K where connectives behave locally at individual worlds
as in Go¨del logic. In particular, GK and GKF are Go¨del modal logics based on, respectively,
standard Kripke frames and Kripke frames with fuzzy accessibility relations.
A fuzzy Kripke frame is a pair F = 〈W,R〉 where W is a non-empty set of worlds and
R : W ×W → [0, 1] is a binary fuzzy accessibility relation on W . If Rxy ∈ {0, 1} for all
x, y ∈ W , then R is called crisp and F is called simply a (standard) Kripke frame. In
this case, we often write R ⊆ W 2 and Rxy or (x, y) ∈ R to mean Rxy = 1. A Kripke
model for GKF is then a 3-tuple K = 〈W,R, V 〉 where 〈W,R〉 is a fuzzy Kripke frame and
V : Var×W → [0, 1] is a mapping, called a valuation, extended to V : FmL♦ ×W → [0, 1]
as follows:
V (⊥, x) = 0
V (⊤, x) = 1
V (A→ B,x) = V (A, x)→G V (B,x)
V (A ∧B,x) = min(V (A, x), V (B,x))
V (A ∨B,x) = max(V (A, x), V (B,x))
V (A, x) = inf{Rxy →G V (A, y) | y ∈W}
V (♦A, x) = sup{min(V (A, y), Rxy) | y ∈W}.
A Kripke model for GK satisfies the extra condition that 〈W,R〉 is a standard Kripke frame.
In this case, the conditions for  and ♦ may also be read as:
V (A, x) = inf({1} ∪ {V (A, y) | Rxy})
V (♦A, x) = sup({0} ∪ {V (A, y) | Rxy}).
A ∈ Fm♦ is valid in 〈W,R, V 〉 if V (A, x) = 1 for all x ∈W . A is L-valid for L ∈ {GK,GK
F},
written |=L A, if A is valid in all Kripke models 〈W,R, V 〉 for L.
An important feature of Go¨del logic and, more particularly, Kripke models for GKF, is
that only the order of truth values matters. The following lemma is proved by a straight-
forward induction on formula complexity.
Lemma 3.1. Let K = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a Kripke model for GKF and h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] an order-
automorphism of the real unit interval. Define K ′ = 〈W,R′, V ′〉 where R′xy = h(Rxy) for
all x, y ∈ W and V ′(p, x) = h(V (p, x)) for each p ∈ Var and x ∈ W . Then V ′(A, x) =
h(V (A, x)) for all A ∈ Fm♦ and x ∈W .
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Moreover, for Kripke models for GK (which, recall, have a crisp accessibility relation),
we can shift the values of all formulas above a certain threshold to 1, while preserving the
values of formulas below that threshold.
Lemma 3.2. Let K = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a Kripke model for GK and λ ∈ (0, 1]. Define K ′ =
〈W,R, V ′〉 where V ′(p, x) = λ →G V (p, x) for each p ∈ Var and x ∈ W . Then V
′(A, x) =
λ→G V (A, x) for all A ∈ Fm♦ and x ∈W .
Proof. We proceed by induction on |A|. The base cases are immediate. Suppose that A is
B → C. Then, using the induction hypothesis for the second step:
V ′(B → C, x) = V ′(B,x)→G V
′(C, x)
= (λ→G V (B,x))→G (λ→G V (C, x))
= λ→G (V (B,x)→G V (C, x))
= λ→G V (B → C, x).
If A is ♦B, then, again using the induction hypothesis for the second step:
V ′(♦B,x) = sup({0} ∪ {V ′(B, y) | Rxy})
= sup({0} ∪ {λ→G V (B, y) | Rxy})
= λ→G sup({0} ∪ {V (B, y) | Rxy})
= λ→G V (♦B,x).
Cases for the other connectives are very similar.
3.2. Box and Diamond Fragments. Due to the difficulty of dealing with the full lan-
guage (see Section 6), we focus in this work on the “box” and “diamond” fragments of GK
and GKF based on restrictions of the language L♦ to the single modality sublanguages
L and L♦, respectively. These fragments are worthy of investigation since they already
contain enough extra expressive power to deal with certain modal fuzzy notions. Indeed the
general approach of [7, 8] begins with a treatment of just the addition of the box operator,
reflecting the fact that in (classical) modal logics, typically just one of the dual modalities
is considered primitive.
We use proof-theoretic methods to establish decidability and complexity results for
these fragments, and completeness for the axiomatizations:
• HGK is HG extended with
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
(Z) ¬¬A→ ¬¬A
A
A
(nec)
• HGK♦ is HG extended with
(K♦) ♦(A ∨B)→ (♦A ∨ ♦B)
(Z♦) ♦¬¬A→ ¬¬♦A
(F♦) ¬♦⊥
(A→ B) ∨C
(♦A→ ♦B) ∨ ♦C
(nec)♦
• HGKF♦ is HGK♦ with (nec)♦ replaced by
A→ B
♦A→ ♦B
(nec)∗♦
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It is proved in [9] that HGK is complete with respect to the box fragments of both
GK and GKF (in other words, these fragments coincide and there is no need to define an
alternative HGKF), and that HGK
F
♦ is complete with respect to the diamond fragment of
GKF. These results, plus completeness for HGK♦ with respect to the diamond fragment of
GK, will follow from our proof-theoretic investigations, as will decidability and complexity
results for all three fragments. First, however, we note the following interesting feature of
Go¨del modal logics.
Theorem 3.3. The box and diamond fragments of GK do not have the finite model property.
Proof. Following [9], consider the L-formula
A = ¬¬p→ ¬¬p.
A is valid in all Kripke models for GK with a finite number of worlds, but not in the Kripke
model 〈N, R, V 〉 where Rxy holds for all x, y ∈ N and V (p, x) = 1/(x+ 1) for all x ∈ N.
Now consider the L♦-formula:
B = (♦p→ ♦q)→ ((♦q → ⊥) ∨ ♦(p→ q)).
We claim first that B is valid in all Kripke models for GK with a finite number of worlds.
Consider a world x. If no worlds are accessible to x, then V (♦q, x) = 0 and V (B,x) =
1. Otherwise, since the model is finite, we can choose an accessible world y such that
V (♦q, x) = V (q, y). If V (p, y) > V (q, y), then V (♦p, x) > V (♦q, x), so also V (B,x) = 1. If
V (p, y) ≤ V (q, y), then V (p→ q, y) = 1, so also V (B,x) = 1.
On the other hand, consider a Kripke model 〈N, R, V 〉 for GK where Rxy holds iff x = 0
and y ≥ 1, V (p, x) = 12 and V (q, x) =
1
2 −
1
x+2 for all x ∈ N. Then V (♦q, 0) = V (♦p, 0) =
V (♦(p→ q), 0) = 12 , so V (B, 0) =
1
2 .
This contrasts with the following result of Caicedo and Rodr´ıguez.
Theorem 3.4 ([9]). The diamond fragment of GKF has the finite model property.
3.3. Sequents of Relations. We extend the definition of validity for sequents of relations
from G to L ∈ {GK,GKF} as follows
|=L S iff for all Kripke models 〈W,R, V 〉 for L and x ∈W ,
V (A, x) ⊳ V (B,x) for some (A ⊳ B) ∈ S
and say in this case that S is L-valid.
We call a sequent of relations propositional if it contains no occurrences of modalities,
and identify the modal part of a sequent of relations S as the relations in S made up of
box formulas, diamond formulas, and constants, calling S purely modal if it coincides with
its modal part. We say that a formula occurs in a sequent of relations if it occurs as the
left or right side of one of the relations. A sequent of relations is said to be propositionally
L-valid for L ∈ {GK,GKF} if the sequent of relations obtained by replacing each occurrence
of a box formula A with a new variable pA and diamond formula ♦A with a new variable
qA is G-valid.
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It will also be helpful to adopt the following notation for sets of relations:
[A1, . . . , An] ⊳ B =def A1 ⊳ B | . . . | An ⊳ B
[] ≤ B =def ⊤ ≤ B
[] < B =def ∅
A ⊳ [B1, . . . , Bm] =def A ⊳ B1 | . . . | A ⊳ Bm
A ≤ [] =def A ⊳⊥
A < [] =def ∅.
Note that we always restrict expressions Γ ⊳ ∆ to cases where either Γ or ∆ has at most
one element. We remark, moreover, that Γ and ∆ can also be considered sets of formulas
rather than multisets without changing the meaning of the notation.
Example 3.5. For instance,
[(p→ q), r → ⊥] ≤ p | [] ≤ (p ∧ q) | (p→ ⊥) < [p, r]
stands for the sequent of relations
(p→ q) ≤ p | r → ⊥ ≤ p | ⊤ ≤ (p ∧ q) | (p→ ⊥) < p | (p→ ⊥) < r.
The logical rules, (com), (wl), and (wr) are L-invertible for L ∈ {GK,GKF}. Hence
applying the logical rules upwards to an L-valid sequent of relations terminates with L-valid
sequent of relations containing only modal formulas and atoms. Since sequents of relations
are sets of pairs of formulas, there is a finite number that can be obtained by applying the
rules backwards to any given sequent of relations. Hence:
Lemma 3.6. Every sequent of relations S is derivable from a set of saturated sequents of
relations {S1, . . . ,Sn} using the logical rules, (com), (cs), (wl), and (wr); moreover, S
is L-valid for L ∈ {GK,GKF} iff Si is L-valid for i = 1 . . . n.
4. The Box Fragment
4.1. The Sequent of Relations Calculus SGK. For convenience, let us assume for this
section that all notions (formulas, rules, etc.) refer exclusively to the sublanguage L. We
define the calculus SGK as the extension of SG (for L) with the modal rule
Γ ≤ B | Π ≤ ⊥
S | Γ ≤ B | Π ≤ ⊥
()
We note that it will emerge that this calculus is sound and complete for both GK and GKF,
and hence that the box fragments of these logic coincide.
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Example 4.1. Consider the following derivation of a sequent of relations corresponding to
the axiom (p→ q)→ (p→ q):
p ≤ q | q < p | p ≤ p
(id)
p ≤ q | q < p | q ≤ q
(id)
p ≤ q | q < p
(com)
p ≤ q | ⊤ ≤ q | q < p
(ew)
p ≤ q | q ≤ q
(id)
p ≤ q | p→ q ≤ q
(→≤)
p ≤ q | (p→ q) ≤ q
()
(p→ q) ≤ p→ q
(≤→)
(p→ q) ≤ p→ q | ⊤ ≤ p→ q
(ew)
⊤ ≤ (p→ q)→ (p→ q)
(≤→)
We prove soundness with respect to Kripke models for GKF, recalling that these include
the Kripke models for GK as a special case.
Theorem 4.2. If ⊢SGK S, then |=GKF S.
Proof. The proof is a standard induction on the height of a derivation in SGK. Let us just
check that the rule () preserves validity in Kripke models for GKF. Note first that it suffices,
using the equivalence in GKF of (A1 → B) ∨ (A2 → B) and (A1 ∧ A2)→ B, to check
that |=GKF A ≤ B | C ≤ ⊥ implies |=GKF A ≤ B | C ≤ ⊥. Suppose, contrapositively,
that 6|=GKF A ≤ B | C ≤ ⊥. I.e., for some Kripke model K = 〈W,R, V 〉 for GK
F and
x ∈W : V (A, x) > V (B,x) and V (C, x) > 0. So for some y ∈W : Rxy →G V (A, y) >
Rxy →G V (B, y) and Rxy →G V (C, y) > 0. But this implies that V (A, y) > V (B, y) and
V (C, y) > 0. So 6|=GKF A ≤ B | C ≤ ⊥ as required.
Completeness is of course more complicated. The challenge is to show that a GK-valid
saturated sequent of relations S is derivable in SGK. This will also show that a GK
F-valid
saturated sequent of relations S is derivable in SGK. Our strategy will be to use Lemmas
4.3 and 4.4 to show that either S is derivable in SG or the modal part of S is itself GK-valid.
For the latter case, S is derivable using () from a less complex sequent of relations shown
to be GK-valid in Lemma 4.5. An inductive argument will then complete the proof.
Lemma 4.3. If S is saturated and GK-valid, then either S is propositionally valid or the
modal part of S is GK-valid.
Proof. Proceeding contrapositively, suppose that a saturated sequent of relations S is not
propositionally valid and the modal part S of S is not GK-valid. Hence for some Kripke
model K = 〈W,R, V 〉 for GK and x ∈ W : V (A, x) 6 ⊳ V (B,x) for each (A ⊳ B) ∈ S. For
each A occurring in S, add a constant cA to the language so that rcA = V (A, x). Let
SP be S with each A occurring in S replaced by cA.
Claim: SP is not G-valid.
Observe that the result follows from this claim. Let v : FmLG → [0, 1] be the propositional
counter-valuation for SP . Define K ′ = 〈W ∪ {x0}, R
′, V ′〉 where:
(1) R′ = R ∪ {(x0, y) | (x, y) ∈ R}
(2) V ′ is V extended with V ′(p, x0) = v(p) for each p ∈ Var.
Then V ′(A, x0) = V (A, x) = rcA for all A occurring in S. So, since v is a counter-
valuation for SP , we have that S is not GK-valid.
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Proof of claim. Suppose that SP is GK-valid. Then since SP is saturated, by Lemma 2.2,
SP contains either (a ≤ a), or (c ⊳ d) for constants c, d such that rC ⊳ rD; i.e., we have one
of the following situations:
(i) SP contains a ≤ a or ⊥ ≤ a or a ≤ ⊤ or ⊥ < ⊤. But then S is propositionally valid,
a contradiction.
(ii) SP contains cC ⊳ cD or cC < ⊤ or ⊥ < cD. But since S is not L-valid, we must have,
respectively that rcC 6⊳ rcD or rcC = 1 or 0 = rcD , a contradiction.
(iii) SP contains a ≤ cD and rcD = 1. But then by (wl), S contains ⊤ ≤ D and rcD < 1,
a contradiction.
(iv) SP contains cC ≤ a and rcC = 0. But then by (wr), S contains C ≤ ⊥ and rcC > 0,
a contradiction.
Lemma 4.4. Let S | S ′ be saturated, purely modal, and GK-valid, where S ′ consists only
of relations of the form A < B. Then S is GK-valid.
Proof. Let us define (com)′ as (com) restricted to instances where ⊳1 is ≤, and say that a
sequent of relations S is semi-saturated if whenever S occurs as the conclusion of a logical
rule, (com)′, (cs), (wl), or (wr), then S also occurs as one of the premises. It is then
sufficient to prove the following:
Claim. If S | A < B is semi-saturated, purely modal, and GK-valid, then S is GK-valid.
We just notice that if S | A < B is semi-saturated, then S is also semi-saturated. Hence
we can apply the claim repeatedly, noting that the case where ⊥ appears on the right is
trivial and when ⊤ appears on the right, we can replace ⊤ with ⊤ and apply the claim.
Proof of claim. Proceeding contrapositively, suppose that 6|=GK S. Then there is a Kripke
model K = 〈W,R, V 〉 for GK and x ∈ W such that V (C, x) 6⊳ V (D,x) for all (C ⊳ D) ∈ S.
Moreover, if V (A, x) ≥ V (B,x), then 6|=GK S | A < B as required, so assume that
(⋆) V (A, x) < V (B,x).
Since S | A < B is semi-saturated, for each (C ≤ D) ∈ S:
either (C ≤ B) ∈ S and so V (C, x) > V (B,x)
or (A ≤ D) ∈ S and so V (A, x) > V (D,x).
In particular:
(⋆⋆) V (A, x) ≤ V (D,x) < V (C, x) ≤ V (B,x) is not possible.
We have two cases. If V (B,x) = 1, then from the above either/or distinction, for each
(C ≤ D) ∈ S: (A ≤ D) ∈ S and V (A, x) > V (D,x). Hence also, since S is non-empty
(containing at least ⊤ ≤ ⊥), V (A, x) > 0. Now, using Lemma 3.2, we obtain a Kripke
model K ′ = 〈W,R, V ′〉 for GK such that V ′(C, y) = V (A, x)→G V (C, y) for all y ∈W and
C ∈ FmL . In particular, V
′(A, x) = V ′(B,x) = 1. Moreover, for all (C⊳D) ∈ S, we have
V ′(C, x) = V (A, x) →G V (C, x) ≥ V (C, x) 6 ⊳ V (D,x) = V (A, x) →G V (D,x) = V
′(D,x).
Hence 6|=GK S | A < B as required.
Now suppose that V (B,x) < 1. Using Lemma 3.1, we choose a suitable automorphism
of [0, 1] and define for each i ∈ Z+, a Kripke model Ki = 〈Wi, Ri, Vi〉 for GK such that:
(1) 〈Wi, Ri〉 is a copy of 〈W,R〉 with distinct worlds for each i ∈ Z
+ where xi is the
corresponding copy of x.
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(2) For all formulas E satisfying Vi(A, xi) < Vi(E, xi) ≤ Vi(B,xi):
Vi(A, xi) < Vi(E, xi) < V (A, xi) + 1/i.
Now we define a model K ′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 such that:
(1) W ′ = {x0} ∪
⋃
i∈Z+ Wi
(2) R′ = {(x0, y) | (xi, y) ∈ Vi for some i ∈ Z
+} ∪
⋃
i∈Z+ Ri
(3) V ′(p, y) = Vi(p, y) for all y ∈Wi and V
′(p, x0) = 0.
But then:
V ′(B,x0) = inf({1} ∪ {V
′(B, y) | R′x0y})
= inf{Vi(B,xi) | i ∈ Z
+}
= V ′(A, x0).
Clearly, if V (C, x) ≥ V (D,x) for some (C < D) ∈ S where C,D are box formulas or
constants, then V ′(C, x0) ≥ V
′(D,x0). Moreover, if (C ≤ D) ∈ S where C,D are box
formulas or constants, then using (⋆⋆), it follows that V ′(C, x0) > V
′(D,x0). Hence 6|=GK
S | A < B as required.
Lemma 4.5. If |=GK {Ai ≤ Bi}
n
i=1 | C ≤ ⊥, then
|=GK
∧
j∈J
Aj ≤
∧
j∈J
Bj | C ≤ ⊥
for some ∅ ⊂ J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. We argue by contraposition; i.e., suppose that:
6|=GK
∧
j∈J
Aj ≤
∧
j∈J
Bi | C ≤ ⊥ for all ∅ ⊂ J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
In particular for i = 1 . . . n:
6|=GK Ai ∧ . . . ∧An ≤ Bi ∧ . . . ∧Bn | C ≤ ⊥.
So for each i = 1 . . . n, there exists a Kripke model Ki = 〈Wi, Ri, Vi〉 for GK and xi ∈ Wi
(with each Wi distinct) such that:
Vi(Ai ∧ . . . ∧An, xi) > Vi(Bi ∧ . . . ∧Bn, xi) and Vi(C, xi) > 0.
Moreover, using Lemma 3.1, we can assume without loss of generality that
Vi(Bi, xi) ≤ Vi(Bk, xi) and so Vi(Ak, xi) > Vi(Bi, xi) for k = i . . . n.
Now, again using Lemma 3.1, we define iteratively K ′i = 〈Wi, Ri, V
′
i 〉 for i = n . . . 1 such
that for j = i . . . n:
(i) V ′j (Bj , xj) < Vk(Aj , xk) for k = 1 . . . i− 1.
(ii) V ′j (Bj , xj) < V
′
k(Aj , xk) for k = i . . . n.
(iii) V ′j (C, xj) > 0.
Let us deal with step i, supposing that we have already dealt with steps n . . . i + 1. We
choose an order automorphism h of [0, 1] scaling the interval [0, Vi(Bi, xi)] to a smaller
interval [0, V ′i (Bi, xi)] so that V
′
i (Bi, xi) = h(V (Bi, xi)) satisfies V
′
i (Bi, xi) < Vk(Ai, xk)
for k = 1 . . . i − 1 and V ′i (Bi, xi) < V
′
k(Ai, xk) for k = i . . . n. This is possible since we
need only force the value V ′i (Bi, xi) to be suitably small. Also clearly V
′
i (C, xi) > 0. Now
consider j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n}. By construction, we already have V ′j (Bj , xj) < Vk(Aj , xk)
for k = 1 . . . i − 1, V ′j (Bj , xj) < V
′
k(Aj , xk) for k = i + 1 . . . n, and V
′
j (C, xj) > 0. So
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it remains only to show that V ′j (Bj , xj) < V
′
i (Aj , xi). Note first that using step j > i,
we have that V ′j (Bj , xj) < Vi(Aj , xi). But Vi(Aj , xi) > Vi(Bi, xi), so we can assume that
V ′i (Aj , xi) = Vi(Aj , xi). Hence V
′
j (Bj , xj) < V
′
i (Aj , xi) as required.
Finally, we define a model K = 〈W,R, V 〉 where for a new world x0:
(1) W =W1 ∪ . . . ∪Wn ∪ {x0}.
(2) R = R1 ∪ . . . ∪Rn ∪ {(x0, x1), . . . , (x0, xn)}}.
(3) V (p, x) = V ′i (p, x) for all x ∈Wi and V (p, x0) = 0.
But then for i = 1 . . . n:
V (Bi, x0) ≤ V
′
i (Bi, xi) < V
′
j (Ai, xj) for j = 1 . . . n.
So V (Bi, x0) < V (Ai, x0). Since also, using (iii), V (C, x0) > 0, we have 6|=GK {Ai ≤
Bi}
n
i=1 | C ≤ ⊥ as required.
Theorem 4.6. If |=GK S, then ⊢SGK S.
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the modal degree of the sequent of relations
S: the maximal complexity of a boxed subformula occurring in S. If the modal degree is
0, then S is propositional and SGK-derivable. Otherwise, by Lemma 3.6 (since working
upwards, the rules do not increase modal degree), we can assume that S is both GK-valid and
saturated. If S is propositionally GK-valid, then it is derivable. Otherwise, by Lemmas 4.3
and 4.4, S is of the form:
S ′ | {Ai ≤ Bi}
n
i=1 | {Cj ≤ ⊥}
m
j=1
and |=GK {Ai ≤ Bi}
n
i=1 | {Cj ≤ ⊥}
m
j=1. But then by Lemma 4.5:
|=GK
∧
i∈I
Ai ≤
∧
i∈I
Bi | {Cj ≤ ⊥}
m
j=1 for some ∅ ⊂ I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
Let us assume without loss of generality that I = {1, . . . , n}. Then also:
|=GK {Ai ≤ Bk}
n
i=1 | {Cj ≤ ⊥}
m
j=1 for k = 1 . . . n.
So by the induction hypothesis and an application of ():
⊢SGK S
′ | {Ai ≤ Bk}
n
i=1 | {Cj ≤ ⊥}
m
j=1 for k = 1 . . . n.
But then S is derivable by repeated applications of (com).
Corollary 4.7. ⊢SGK S iff |=GKF S iff |=GK S.
4.2. Consequences. We can use the above characterization of SGK to give an alternative
proof of completeness of the axiomatization HGK with respect to both standard and fuzzy
Kripke frames, recalling that this result was first obtained by Caicedo and Rodr´ıguez in [9].
Theorem 4.8. ⊢HGK A iff |=GKF A iff |=GK A.
Proof. We can easily show that the axioms of HGK are GK
F-valid and that the rules
(mp) and (nec) preserve GK
F-validity. So ⊢HGK A implies |=GKF A, which, since all
Kripke frames are fuzzy Kripke frames, implies |=GK A. On the other hand, if |=GK A,
then by Theorem 4.6, ⊢SGK ⊤ ≤ A. Hence it suffices to show that ⊢SGK S implies
⊢HGK IS(S). I.e., we need that for each rule S1, . . . ,Sn / S of SGK, whenever ⊢HGK IS(Si)
for i = 1 . . . n, also ⊢HGK IS(S). This is straightforward for the logical rules and easy for the
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axioms and structural rules, so let us just consider the case of (). Using the derivability
⊢HGK ((A1 → B) ∨ (A2 → B)) ↔ ((A1 ∧ A2) → B), it is enough to show that
⊢HGK (A → B) ∨ ¬C implies ⊢HGK (A → B) ∨ ¬C. Note first that ⊢HG (¬¬F →
G) ↔ (G ∨ ¬F ). Hence if ⊢HGK (A → B) ∨ ¬C, then ⊢HGK ¬¬C → (A → B). But then
by (nec), ⊢HGK (¬¬C → (A → B)) and using (K), ⊢HGK ¬¬C → (A → B).
Hence, using (Z), ⊢HGK ¬¬C → (A → B), and finally, ⊢HGK (A → B) ∨ ¬C
as required.
Our completeness proof for SGK can also be exploited to obtain a precise bound for
the complexity of the GK-validity problem for the box fragment, namely the problem of
checking |=GK A for any A ∈ FmL .
Theorem 4.9. The validity problem for the box fragment of GK is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. First we show that checking GK-validity for the box fragment is PSPACE-hard. We
recall that the modal logic K is PSPACE-complete (see, e.g., [10]). Consider the translation
∗ sending each propositional variable p to its double negation ¬¬p. We can easily show
that |=K A iff |=GK A
∗ which establishes that the validity problem for the box fragment of
GK must also be PSPACE-hard. For the non-trivial direction consider any Kripke model
〈W,R, V 〉 for GK and define a standard Kripke model 〈W,R, V ′〉 by stipulating: V ′(p, x) =
V (¬¬p, x). Then by a simple induction, V ′(C, x) = V (C∗, x) ∈ {0, 1} for any C ∈ FmL .
Hence if 6|=GK A
∗, then 6|=GK A.
For PSPACE-inclusion, we consider derivations in the sequent of relations calculus
SGK. Given a formula A ∈ FmL , let Sub(A) be the set of subformulas of A together with
⊤,⊥, and consider the set
ΦA = {C ⊳ D | C,D ∈ Sub(A), ⊳ ∈ {<,≤}}.
The cardinality of ΦA is O(|A|
2). Since any sequent of relations appearing in a derivation
of ⊤ ≤ A is a subset of ΦA, its size is also O(|A|
2).
We now consider the length of branches in the search for a derivation of ⊤ ≤ A in SGK.
Using the GK-invertibility of the logical rules we assume that any branch of a derivation is
expanded by applying iteratively the rules upwards in the following order:
(1) Apply the logical rules, (wl), (wr), (cs), and (com) in order to obtain a saturated
sequent and check the axioms.
(2) Apply () and restart from (1) with the premise of this rule.
The length of the branch built in (1) is O(|A|2) since each logical rule replaces one relation
with one or two relations involving formulas of smaller complexity, and each application of
(wl), (wr), (cs), and (com) add exactly one relation at a time, with the total number
of different relations possible being O(|A|2). The sequent obtained in (2) by applying ()
has a smaller or equal number of relations and a strictly smaller modal degree. The entire
length of a proof branch is hence bounded by O(|A|2×m) = O(|A|3), where m is the modal
degree of A.
Thus storing a branch of a proof requires only polynomial space. Moreover, the branch-
ing is at most binary. As usual, we search for a proof in a depth-first manner: we store
one branch at a time together with some information (requiring a small amount of space,
say logarithmic space) to reconstruct branching points and backtracking points, the latter
determined by alternative applications of (). Hence the total amount of space needed for
carrying out proof search is polynomial in |A|, and so deciding validity for the box fragment
of GK is in PSPACE.
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Note that the validity problem for modal finite-valued Go¨del logics (in the full language)
is also PSPACE-complete. This result was established in [6] using a reduction to the classical
case for the equivalent problem for description logics based on finite-valued Go¨del logics.
4.3. A Hypersequent Calculus. A more elegant analytic calculus for the box fragment
– lacking, however, the invertible logical rules of SG – can be presented in the framework of
hypersequents. In particular, let us define the hypersequent calculus GGK as the extension
of the calculus GG given in Figure 3 (for L) with the modal rule:
Π⇒| Γ⇒ A
Π⇒| Γ⇒ A
()
() is a version of the ordinary Gentzen rule for the (classical) modal logic K, obtained
by adding the extra sequent Π ⇒ in the premise and Π ⇒ in the conclusion. This extra
component reflects the fact that ⊥ is interpreted as the bottom element 0 in each world.
Example 4.10. All the axioms of HGK are derivable in GGK; e.g., for (Z):
p⇒ p (id)
p,¬p⇒ (¬⇒)
p⇒ p (id)
p,¬p⇒ (¬⇒)
p, p⇒| ¬p,¬p⇒
(com)
p, p⇒| ¬p⇒
(cl)
p⇒| ¬p⇒
(cl)
p⇒|⇒ ¬¬p
(⇒¬)
p⇒|⇒ ¬¬p
()
⇒ ¬p |⇒ ¬¬p
(⇒¬)
¬¬p⇒|⇒ ¬¬p
(¬⇒)
¬¬p⇒| ¬¬p⇒ ¬¬p
(wl)
¬¬p⇒ ¬¬p | ¬¬p⇒ ¬¬p
(wr)
¬¬p⇒ ¬¬p
(ec)
⇒ ¬¬p→ ¬¬p
(→⇒)
It will be helpful for proving cut-elimination to consider the following generalizations
of the rule (), derivable using (com), (), (cl), and (wl):
Π1 ⇒| . . . | Πn ⇒| Γ⇒ A
Π1 ⇒| . . . | Πn ⇒| Γ⇒ A
()n
(n ∈ N)
For example, in the case of n = 2, we have the derivation:
Π1 ⇒| Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
...
(wl)
Π1,Π2 ⇒| Π1,Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
(wl)
Π1,Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
(ec)
Π1,Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
()
Π1 ⇒| Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
...
(wl)
Π1,Π2 ⇒| Π1,Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
(wl)
Π1,Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
(ec)
Π1,Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
()
Π1,Π1 ⇒| Π2,Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
(com)
...
(cl)
Π1 ⇒| Π2 ⇒| Γ⇒ A
(cl)
Theorem 4.11. ⊢GGK G iff |=GK IH(G).
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Proof. The left-to-right direction (soundness) is proved as usual by induction on the height
of a derivation in GGK. For the right-to-left direction (completeness), we make use of
the completeness of the axiom system HGK established in Theorem 4.8. I.e., |=GK IH(G)
implies ⊢HGK IH(G). But now, since all the axioms of HGK are derivable in GGK and the
rules (mp) and (nec) are also derivable, we have that ⊢HGK IH(G) implies ⊢GGK IH(G).
Finally, it is straightforward to show (following [25], Proposition 4.61) that ⊢GGK IH(G)
implies ⊢GGK G as required.
Let us show now that cut-elimination holds for GGK, i.e., that there is a constructive
procedure for transforming a derivation of a hypersequent G in this calculus into a derivation
of G with no applications of (cut). We write d ⊢S X to denote that d is a derivation of X
in a calculus S and |d| for the height of the derivation considered as a tree. We also recall
that the principal formula of an application of a rule is the distinguished formula in the
conclusion and that the cut-formula of an application of (cut) is the formula appearing in
the premises but not the conclusion.
Theorem 4.12. Cut-elimination holds for GGK.
Proof. Let GGK◦ be GGK with (cut) removed. Then to establish cut-elimination for
GGK it is sufficient to give a constructive proof of the following:
Claim. If d1 ⊢GGK◦

[Γi, [A]
λi ⇒ ∆i]
n
i=1 and d2 ⊢GGK◦ H | [Πj ⇒ A]
m
j=1,
then ⊢GGK◦

H | [Γi,Π
λi
j ⇒ ∆i]
j=1...m
i=1...n .
We proceed by induction on the lexicographically ordered pair 〈|A|, |d1|+ |d2|〉. If the last
step in d1 or d2 is an axiom, then the result follows almost immediately. Also, if the last
step in either derivation is not () or does not have the cut-formula A as the principal
formula, then the result follows by applications of the induction hypothesis to the premises
and applications of the same rule and structural rules. Suppose for example that one of the
derivations ends with an application of (com) (the other derivation may end with ()):
G | Γ′1,Γ
′
2, [A]
λ
′
1
+λ
′
2 ⇒ ∆1 G | Γ
′′
1 ,Γ
′′
2 , [A]
λ
′′
1
+λ
′′
2 ⇒ ∆2
G | Γ′1,Γ
′′
1 , [A]
λ
′
1
+λ
′′
1 ⇒ ∆1 | Γ′2,Γ
′′
2 , [A]
λ
′
2
+λ
′′
2 ⇒ ∆2
where G = [Γi, [A]
λi ⇒ ∆i]
n
i=3. Then by the induction hypothesis twice:
⊢GGK◦

H′ | [Γ′1,Γ
′
2,Π
λ′1+λ
′
2
j ⇒ ∆1]
m
j=1 and ⊢GGK◦ H
′ | [Γ′′1 ,Γ
′′
2,Π
λ′′1+λ
′′
2
j ⇒ ∆2]
m
j=1
where H′ = H | [Γi,Π
λi
j ⇒ ∆i]
j=1...m
i=3...n . The required hypersequent:
H′ | [Γ′1,Π
λ′1+λ
′′
1
j ,Γ
′′
1 ⇒ ∆1]
m
j=1 | [Γ
′
2,Π
λ′2+λ
′′
2
j ,Γ
′′
2 ⇒ ∆2]
m
j=1
is derivable by repeated applications of (com), (ec), and (ew).
If a distinguished occurrence of A is the principal formula in both derivations and of the
form B∧C, B∨C, or B → C, then we can first use the induction hypothesis applied to the
premises in one derivation and the conclusion in the other, and then apply the induction
hypothesis again with cut-formulas B and C of smaller complexity. The result follows using
applications of (ec) and/or (ew) as required. Consider then the hardest case where both
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derivations d1 and d2 end as follows with an application of () and A is of the form B:
...
Γ1, [B]
λ1 ⇒| Γ2, [B]λ2 ⇒ C
Γ1, [B]
λ1 ⇒| Γ2, [B]λ2 ⇒ C
()
...
Σ⇒| Π⇒ B
Σ⇒| Π⇒ B
()
Then since |B| < |B|, we can apply the induction hypothesis to the GGK◦-derivable hy-
persequents (Γ1, [B]
λ1 ⇒| Γ2, [B]
λ2 ⇒ C) and (Σ ⇒| Π⇒ B) to obtain a GGK◦-derivation
of (Σ ⇒| Γ1,Π
λ1 ⇒| Γ2,Π
λ2 ⇒ C). Hence by an application of the derived rule ()2, we
obtain a GGK◦-derivation of Σ⇒| Γ1,Π
λ1 ⇒| Γ2,Π
λ2 ⇒ C as required.
We note finally that a related hypersequent calculus GGKr was defined (along with
many other such calculi) in [11] by extending GG with the rule:
G | Γ⇒ A
G | Γ⇒ A
It was shown in [11] that GGKr is complete with respect to the standard semantics for Go¨del
logic extended with a unary function on [0, 1] that can be interpreted in fuzzy logic as a
“truth stresser” modality such as “very true”.
5. The Diamond Fragments
5.1. Sequent of Relations Calculi. Let us turn our attention now to the (distinct) dia-
mond fragments of GK and GKF, and for convenience assume for the rest of this section that
all notions (formulas, rules, etc.) refer exclusively to the sublanguage L♦. We introduce the
following systems:
• SGK♦ consists of SG (for L♦) extended with:
A ≤ ∆ | ⊥ < Σ | ⊤ ≤ Θ
S | ♦A ≤ ♦∆ | ⊥ < ♦Σ | ⊤ ≤ ♦Θ
(♦)
• SGKF♦ consists of SG (for L♦) extended with:
A ≤ ∆ | ⊥ < Σ
S | ♦A ≤ ♦∆ | ⊥ < ♦Σ
(♦)∗
Example 5.1. Axioms from (Z♦) are derivable in both SGK♦ and SGK
F
♦:
p ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ < p | p ≤ p
(id)
p ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ < p | ⊥ ≤ ⊥
(id)
p ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ < p
(com)
p ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ < ⊥ | ⊥ < p
(ew)
⊥ < ⊤ | ⊥ < p
(<)
⊥ < ¬p | ⊥ < p
(<¬)
¬¬p ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ < p
(¬≤)
♦¬¬p ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ < ♦p
(♦)∗
♦¬¬p ≤ ⊥ | ¬♦p ≤ ⊥
(¬≤)
♦¬¬p ≤ ¬¬♦p
(≤¬)
⊤ ≤ ¬¬♦p | ♦¬¬p ≤ ¬¬♦p
(ew)
⊤ ≤ ♦¬¬p→ ¬¬♦p
(≤→)
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However, the opposite direction is derivable only in SGK♦:
⊥ < p | p ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ ≤ ⊥
(id)
⊥ < p | p ≤ ⊥ | p ≤ p
(id)
⊥ < p | p ≤ ⊥
(com)
¬p ≤ ⊥ | p ≤ ⊥
(¬≤)
¬p ≤ ⊥ | ⊤ ≤ ⊥ | p ≤ ⊥
(ew)
⊤ ≤ ¬¬p | p ≤ ⊥
(≤¬)
⊤ ≤ ♦¬¬p | ♦p ≤ ⊥
(♦)
⊤ ≤ ♦¬¬p | ♦p ≤ ⊥ | ⊥ < ⊥
(ew)
⊤ ≤ ♦¬¬p | ⊥ < ⊤
(<)
⊤ ≤ ♦¬¬p | ⊥ < ¬♦p
(<¬)
¬¬♦p ≤ ♦¬¬p
(¬≤)
⊤ ≤ ♦¬¬p | ¬¬♦p ≤ ♦¬¬p
(ew)
⊤ ≤ ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p
(≤→)
Theorem 5.2. Let L ∈ {GK,GKF}. If ⊢SL♦ S, then |=L S.
Proof. Again, the proof is a straightforward induction on the height of a derivation, and
it suffices to check that (♦) and (♦)∗ preserve GK-validity and GKF-validity, respectively.
Moreover, using the distributivity of ♦ over ∨, we can assume that ∆, Σ, and Θ each
contain exactly one formula. Hence for (♦) suppose contrapositively that for some K =
〈W,R, V 〉 and x ∈ W : V (♦A, x) > V (♦B,x), V (♦C, x) = 0, and V (♦D,x) < 1. Then
there is a world y such that Rxy and V (A, y) > V (B, y), V (C, y) = 0, and V (D, y) < 1 as
required. Now for (♦)∗ suppose contrapositively that for some K = 〈W,R, V 〉 and x ∈ W :
V (♦A, x) > V (♦B,x) and V (♦C, x) = 0. Then for some world y: min(V (A, y), Rxy) >
min(V (B, y), Rxy), which implies V (A, y) > V (B, y), and V (♦C, x) = 0.
Completeness proofs mostly follow the same pattern as the proof for SGK; however,
there exist a couple of significant differences in the details.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose that S is saturated and L-valid for L ∈ {GK,GKF}. Then either S is
propositionally L-valid or the modal part of S is L-valid.
Proof. Proceeding contrapositively, let S♦ be the modal part of S and suppose that S♦ is
not L-valid and S is not propositionally L-valid. Then for some model K = 〈W,R, V 〉 for
L and x ∈ W : V (A, x) 6 ⊳ V (B,x) for all (A ⊳ B) ∈ S♦. For each ♦A occurring in S, let
us add a constant cA to the language so that rcA = V (♦A, x). Let S
P be S with each ♦A
occurring in S replaced by cA. Exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4.3, it follows that S
P is
not L-valid. But now let v : FmLG → [0, 1] be the propositional counter-valuation for S
P .
Define K ′ = 〈W ∪ {x0}, R
′, V ′〉 where:
(1) R′yz =


Ryz y, z ∈W
Rxz y = x0, z ∈W
0 z = x0.
(2) V ′ is V extended with V ′(p, x0) = v(p) for all p ∈ Var.
Then for each ♦A occurring in S:
V ′(♦A, x0) = sup
y∈W
(min(V ′(A, y), Rx0y)) = sup
y∈W
(min(V (A, y), Rxy)) = V (♦A, x) = rcA.
So, since v is a counter-valuation for SP , we have that S is not L-valid as required.
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Lemma 5.4. Let S | S ′ be saturated, purely modal, and L-valid for L ∈ {GK,GKF}, where
S ′ consists only of relations of the form ♦A < B. Then S is L-valid.
Proof. Recall that (com)′ is defined as (com) restricted to instances where ⊳1 is ≤, and that
an atomic sequent of relations S is semi-saturated if whenever S occurs as the conclusion of
(com)′, (cs), (wl), or (wr), then S also occurs as one of the premises. It is then sufficient
to prove the following:
Claim. If S | ♦A < B is semi-saturated, purely modal, and L-valid for L ∈ {GK,GKF}, then
S is L-valid.
Proof of claim. Proceeding contrapositively, suppose that S is not L-valid. Then there
is a Kripke model K = 〈W,R, V 〉 for L and x ∈ W such that V (C, x) 6 ⊳ V (D,x) for all
(C ⊳D) ∈ S. Moreover, if V (♦A, x) ≥ V (B,x), then S | ♦A < B is not L-valid as required,
so assume that:
(⋆) V (♦A, x) < V (B,x).
Since S | ♦A < B is semi-saturated, for each (C ≤ D) ∈ S:
either (C ≤ B) ∈ S and so V (C, x) > V (B,x)
or (♦A ≤ D) ∈ S and so V (♦A, x) > V (D,x).
In particular:
(⋆⋆) V (♦A, x) ≤ V (D,x) < V (C, x) ≤ V (B,x) is not possible.
Suppose that V (♦A, x) = 0. Using (cs) and (com), either (♦A ≤ ⊥) ∈ S or (⊥ < B) ∈ S.
In the first case, V (♦A,w) > 0, a contradiction. In the second, V (B,x) = 0, also a
contradiction. So let us assume V (♦A, x) > 0. Then using Lemma 3.1, we define for each
i ∈ Z+, a Kripke model Ki = 〈Wi, Ri, Vi〉 for L such that:
(1) 〈Wi, Ri〉 is a copy of 〈W,R〉 with distinct worlds for each i ∈ Z
+ where xi is the
corresponding copy of x.
(2) For all formulas E satisfying Vi(♦A, xi) ≤ Vi(E, xi) < Vi(B,xi):
Vi(B,xi)− 1/i < Vi(E, xi) < V (B,xi).
Now we define a model K ′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 where:
(1) W ′ = {x0} ∪
⋃
i∈Z+ Wi
(2) R′yz =


Riyz y, z ∈Wi
Rixiz y = x0, z ∈Wi
0 z = x0
(3) V ′(p, y) = Vi(p, y) for all y ∈Wi and V
′(p, x0) = 0.
But then:
V ′(♦A, x0) = supy∈W (min(V (A, y), R
′x0y)
= sup{supy∈Wi(min(V (A, y), Rixiy) | i ∈ Z
+}
= sup{Vi(♦A, xi) | i ∈ Z
+}
= V ′(B,x0).
Now consider (C ⊳D) ∈ S, recalling that C and D are diamond formulas, ⊥, or ⊤. Clearly,
if ⊳ is <, then V ′(C, x0) ≥ V
′(D,x0). If ⊳ is ≤, then using (⋆⋆), it follows that V
′(C, x0) >
V ′(D,x0). So S | ♦A < B is not L-valid as required.
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The next lemma is particular to the diamond fragment of GKF and is necessary for the
extra step, not required in the case of GK, of removing relations of the form ⊤ ≤ ♦A.
Lemma 5.5. If (S | ⊤ ≤ ♦A) is modal, saturated, and GKF-valid, then S is GKF-valid.
Proof. We argue by contraposition. Suppose that S is not GKF-valid. Then there is a
Kripke model K = 〈W,R, V 〉 for GKF and x ∈ W such that V (C, x) 6 ⊳ V (D,x) for all
(C ⊳ D) ∈ S. Fix a value λ < 1 such that whenever V (♦B,x) < 1 for some ♦B occurring
in S, also V (♦B,x) < λ. We define a Kripke model K ′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 for GKF where:
(1) W ′ = {x0} ∪W
(2) R′yz =


Ryz y, z ∈W
min(λ,Rxz) y = x0, z ∈W
0 z = x0
(3) V ′(p, y) = V (p, y) for all y ∈W and V ′(p, x0) = 0.
But then:
V ′(♦A, x0) = supy∈W (min(V
′(A, y), R′x0y))
= supy∈W (min(V (A, y),min(λ,Rxy)))
=
{
V (♦A, x) if V (♦A, x) < 1
λ otherwise.
So (S | ⊤ ≤ ♦A) is not GKF-valid as required.
Note that the following lemma includes relations of the form ⊤ ≤ ♦A and holds even
in the case of GKF where they are not needed.
Lemma 5.6. If |=L {♦Ai ≤ ♦Bi}
n
i=1 | ⊥ < ♦C | ⊤ ≤ ♦D for L ∈ {GK,GK
F}, then
|=L
∧
j∈J
Aj ≤
∧
j∈J
Bj | ⊥ < C | ⊤ ≤ D
for some ∅ ⊂ J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. We argue by contraposition; i.e., suppose that:
6|=L
∧
j∈J
Aj ≤
∧
j∈J
Bj | ⊥ < C | ⊤ ≤ D for all ∅ ⊂ J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
We obtain a model for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} as follows. By assumption:
6|=L Ai ∧ . . . ∧An ≤ Bi ∧ . . . ∧Bn | ⊥ < C | ⊤ ≤ D.
So we have Ki = 〈Wi, Ri, Vi〉 and xi ∈Wi (with each Wi distinct) such that:
(1) Vi(Ai ∧ . . . ∧An, xi) > Vi(Bi ∧ . . . ∧Bn, xi)
(2) Vi(C) = 0 and Vi(D) < 1.
Moreover, without loss of generality we can assume:
Vi(Bi, xi) ≤ Vi(Bk, xi) and so Vi(Ak, xi) > Vi(Bi, xi) for k = i . . . n.
Now using Lemma 3.1 as in the case of Lemma 4.5, we define iteratively K ′i = 〈Wi, R
′
i, V
′
i 〉
for i = n . . . 1 such that for j = i . . . n:
(1) V ′k(Bj , xk) < Vk(Aj , xj) for k = 1 . . . i− 1
(2) V ′j (Bj , xj) < V
′
k(Aj , xk) for k = i . . . n
(3) V ′j (C, xj) = 0 and V
′
j (D,xj) < 1.
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Finally, we define a model K = 〈W,R, V 〉 where for a new world x0:
(i) W =W1 ∪ . . . ∪Wn ∪ {x0}
(ii) Rxy =


Rixy x, y ∈Wi
1 x = x0, y = xi for i ∈ {1 . . . n}
0 y = x0
(iii) V (p, x) = V ′i (p, x) for all x ∈Wi and V (p, x0) = 0.
As in Lemma 4.5, we obtain 6|=L {♦Ai ≤ ♦Bi}
n
i=1 | ⊥ < ♦C | ⊤ ≤ ♦D as required.
Our desired result is then obtained following the same pattern as in the completeness
proof for the box case.
Theorem 5.7. For L ∈ {GK,GKF}: |=L S iff ⊢SL♦ S.
5.2. Consequences. As in the case of the box fragment, we can use our completeness
result for sequent of relations calculi to establish completeness also for the axiomatizations
of the diamond fragments presented in Section 3.2.
Theorem 5.8. For L ∈ {GK,GKF}: |=L A iff ⊢HL♦ A.
Proof. Let L ∈ {GK,GKF}. Following the proof of Theorem 4.8, it suffices to show that for
each rule S1, . . . ,Sn / S of SL♦, whenever ⊢HL♦ I(Si) for i = 1 . . . n, also ⊢HL♦ I(S). In
particular, let us just consider the case of (♦) for HGK♦, since the case of (♦)
∗ for HGKF♦
follows exactly the same pattern. Using the derivabilities ⊢HGK♦ ((A → ♦B1) ∨ (A →
♦B2))↔ (A→ ♦(B1 ∨B2)) and ⊢HGK♦ (¬♦A ∧ ¬♦B)↔ ¬♦(A ∨B), it is enough to show
that ⊢HGK♦ ¬C → ((A→ B)∨D) implies ⊢HGK♦ ¬♦C → ((♦A→ ♦B)∨♦D). Suppose that
⊢HGK♦ ¬C → ((A → B) ∨D). Then using the derivability ⊢HG (¬¬F → G) ↔ (G ∨ ¬F ),
we have ⊢HGK♦ ¬¬C ∨ ((A → B) ∨ D). Applying (nec)♦, we get ⊢HGK♦ (♦A → ♦B) ∨
♦(¬¬C ∨D), and using (K♦), we have ⊢HGK♦ (♦A→ ♦B)∨ (♦¬¬C ∨♦D). Using (Z♦), we
obtain ⊢HGK♦ (♦A→ ♦B) ∨ (¬¬♦C ∨ ♦D), and finally ⊢HGK♦ ¬♦C → ((♦A→ ♦B) ∨ ♦D)
as required.
The proof of the following complexity results follows exactly the same pattern as in the
proof of Theorem 4.9 for the box fragment of GK.
Theorem 5.9. The validity problems for the diamond fragments of GK and GKF are
PSPACE-complete.
Note finally that it is not so easy to extend the hypersequent calculus GG to calculi for
the diamond fragments, since there is no natural way to interpret strict inequality relations
of the form ⊥ < A as sequents. One option would be to add decomposition rules for dealing
with formulas A → ⊥ on the left of sequents occurring in a hypersequent. Completeness
of the cut-free calculus could then be proved via a translation into sequents of relations.
However, establishing cut elimination would be complicated and it is difficult to see how
such a calculus could be easily extended to the first-order level or adapted to other logics.
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6. Discussion
In this paper we have presented proof systems for the diamond and box fragments of two
minimal normal modal logics based on a Go¨del fuzzy logic GK, where the accessibility
relation is classical (crisp), and GKF, where the accessibility relation is fuzzy. In particular,
we have introduced a sequent of relations calculus and a hypersequent calculus (admitting
cut-elimination) for the box fragment of GK, which coincides with the same fragment of
GKF, and sequent of relations calculi for the (distinct) diamond fragments of GK and GKF.
We have used the calculi to establish completeness for corresponding axiomatizations of
the fragments (a new result in the case of the diamond fragment of GK) and to establish
new decidability and PSPACE complexity bounds. Finally, in this section, we discuss some
related work and avenues for further research.
6.1. Related Proof Systems. As observed already in the introduction, numerous proof
systems for Go¨del logic may be found in the literature, encompassing sequent calculi [29, 13],
hypersequent calculi [2, 3], sequent of relations calculi [4], decomposition systems [3], graph-
based methods [23], and goal-directed systems [25]. Our choice of the sequent of relations
and hypersequent frameworks for Go¨del modal logics was guided by a number of factors.
First, like the sequent, decomposition, graph-based, and goal-directed systems, and also
the hypersequent calculus GLC∗ of [3], the sequent of relations calculus for Go¨del logic has
invertible logical rules. Unlike most of these other systems, however, the rules deal directly
with the top-level connective of formulas and may be described as reasonably “natural” or at
least relatively easy to understand. Most significantly, perhaps, the framework facilitates a
relatively straightforward addition of modalities and easier completeness proofs than would
be obtained in, e.g., a sequent calculus framework. Moreover, it seems (without working
through all the details) that the rules obtained and completeness proofs for other calculi
with invertible rules would be very similar and indeed could be obtained by translating our
results into these frameworks. For example, a multiple conclusion sequent A1, . . . , An ⇒
B1, . . . , Bm interpreted as (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → (B1 ∨ . . . ∨ Bm) is G-valid iff the sequent of
relations A1 < ⊤ | . . . | Am < ⊤ | ⊤ ≤ B1 | . . . | ⊤ ≤ Bm is G-valid. Conversely, a sequent
of relations A1 < B1 | . . . | An < Bn | C1 ≤ D1 | . . . | Cm ≤ Dm is G-valid iff the sequent
B1 → A1, . . . , Bn → An ⇒ C1 → D1, . . . , Cm → Dm is G-valid.
We do not of course mean to suggest that the other mentioned frameworks cannot be
useful tools for investigating Go¨del modal logics. Indeed, while our sequent of relations
calculi provide ready-to-implement decision procedures for the box and diamond fragments
of GK of optimal complexity and avoiding loop checking, it may be that other calculi
provide a more suitable basis for developing automated reasoning methods. In particular,
there exist fast graph-based methods (see [23]) for more details) for the P-time problem
of checking whether an atomic sequent of relations is G-valid (required in our algorithm
before applying the modal rules). Other gains in efficiency may be obtained by avoiding
duplication of subformulas using graph-based representations of sequents of relations, and by
implementing some form of “goal-directed” proof search. We mention also that our calculi
provide a starting point for developing algorithms for fuzzy description logics based on
Go¨del logic (as opposed to the systems based on finite-valued or witnessed models [21, 6]),
although since our results are so far restricted to the box and diamond fragments, this
development would depend on the language under consideration.
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The hypersequent calculus GG does not have invertible logical rules and is useful, not
as a basis for automated reasoning methods, but rather as a suitable tool for tackling the-
oretical problems for Go¨del logic. Unlike the other mentioned calculi, it has been extended
to the first-order level (preserving cut-elimination) and used to establish properties such
as Herbrand’s theorem, Skolemization, and standard completeness for Go¨del logic [5, 25].
Similarly, the hypersequent calculus GGK for the box fragments of GK and GK
F can be
extended to a first-order system admitting cut-elimination, although establishing complete-
ness with respect to a semantics based on Kripke frames could be a challenging problem.
Let us remark also that since hypersequents provide a general uniform framework for fuzzy
and other substructural logics (see [25]), this may hold also for modal fuzzy logics. Cer-
tainly, structural rules can be removed from GGK to obtain hypersequent calculi admitting
cut-elimination. The challenge then, as in the first-order case, is to relate such calculi to
a semantics based on Kripke frames. A further limitation currently is also that we have a
hypersequent calculus only for the box fragment. Calculi for the diamond fragments can be
obtained by translation from the sequent of relations systems but uniformity and extensions
to the first-order level or other logics are lost.
6.2. Related Logics. Go¨del logic is renowned not just as a fuzzy logic but also as a
well-known intermediate logic. It therefore makes sense to ask what relationship GK and
GKF bear to modal intuitionistic and intermediate logics found in the literature. From a
semantic perspective, the approaches are significantly different. Kripke models for the most
popular intuitionistic modal logic IK (see, e.g., [28]) and other modal intermediate logics (see,
e.g., [31]) make use of two accessibility relations, one for the modal operator and another for
the intuitionistic connectives. Since Kripke models for Go¨del logic are linearly ordered, the
resulting Kripke models for Go¨del modal logics developed in this way are also linear, which
is not the case in general for Kripke models for GK or GKF. A closer comparison semantically
could be made with an “intuitionistic modal logic” defined by considering standard modal
Kripke frames equipped with an intuitionistic Kripke frame at each node. Nevertheless,
from a syntactic perspective, GK and GKF may be viewed as intermediate modal logics in
the sense that each GK-valid formula (which includes each GKF-valid formula) is valid in
K and also every IK-valid formula is GKF-valid (and therefore also GK-valid). The latter
follows easily from the fact that (see, e.g., [28]) an axiomatization for IK is given by an
axiomatization for intuitionistic logic extended with (K), (K♦), (F♦), (nec), and the
GKF-valid “connecting axioms” (A→ B)→ (♦A→ ♦B) and (♦A→ B)→ (A→ B).
We may also consider the situation regarding modal finite-valued Go¨del logics, obtained
from our definitions by restricting valuations to 0, 1, and a particular finite number of truth
values in [0, 1]. We expect that sequent of relations calculi can be obtained for the same
fragments of modal finite-valued Go¨del logics using the modal rules provided in this paper
but adding axioms for the propositional case. However, developing these calculi is not so
interesting from a theoretical perspective, since the logics are already known to be PSPACE-
complete [6] (proved in the context of Go¨del description logics by mapping to the classical
case). Similarly, we can consider witnessed Go¨del modal logics where the values of box
formulas A and diamond formulas ♦A are attained by A at some world. Calculi for these
logics can (we expect) be developed in our framework, but it also seems possible to obtain
PSPACE-completeness results using the methods of [6] by providing a bound (based on the
formula to be proved) to reduce validity to validity in a modal finite-valued Go¨del logic.
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6.3. Further Work. As noted in the introduction, this paper provides only a starting
point for investigating Go¨del modal logics. The most pressing concern is to extend our proof-
theoretic treatment to the full language of GK and GKF, and thereby obtain axiomatization,
decidability, and complexity results for these logics. It has been conjectured by Caicedo
and Rodr´ıguez that an axiomatization for GKF is provided by the axioms and rules for the
box and diamond fragments extended with the connection axioms of IK (see the previous
subsection), but a proof using their algebraic approach is still lacking. From our more proof-
theoretic perspective, the difficulty is that appropriate sequent of relations rules should
deal with several combinations of box and diamond fragments occurring in relations, i.e.,
A ⊳ B, A ⊳ ♦B, ♦A ⊳ B, ♦A ⊳ ♦B where ⊳ is ≤ or <, plus relations involving ⊥ or
⊤. The combinatorial nature of the required rules leads to an explosion in the number of
cases that should be considered in the completeness proof, and it is not clear that the ideas
developed in this paper of squeezing or pushing up or down valuations suffice to cope with
all possibilities. It may therefore be preferable to consider a more general framework than
sequent of relations, perhaps using labels to encode semantic information.
We also intend to consider stronger modal logics such as the box and diamond fragments
axiomatized in [9] based on fuzzy Kripke frames satisfying further properties of reflexivity,
transitivity, seriality, and symmetry. Our conjecture is that we can extend the sequent of
relation calculus to handle all these conditions except possibly symmetry. Again, however, a
more general (labelled) framework might be useful. Finally, a further direction of research is
the extension of our proof systems to a richer language comprising multiple modalities and
truth constants, interesting for applications to fuzzy description logics (see, e.g., [30, 21, 6]).
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